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The Research and the Methodology: An Introductory Overview 
 
This paper will give an overview about the research project: “Negotiating Development: 
Translocal Gendered Spaces in Muslim Societies”1 and the methodology adopted. It focuses 
on presenting preliminary results of the field work conducted in Malaysia, Senegal and Sudan 
including the main development discourses and the actors engaged in negotiating the various 
development concepts in the three countries under research. However, before focusing on the 
empirical findings of the field research, it is important to give an overview of the project and 
the methodology adopted for the research. 
 
The idea of the project is to study the 'travelling' of development concepts and discourses such 
as gender equality, poverty and human rights. We concentrate on these global concepts as 
they provide a stage to study how various cultural forces are laying competing claims to shape 
the processes of social transformation both at the local and global levels. 
 
The research aims at deconstructing the notion of cultural blocks by analysing the translocal 
networks and relations of women's NGOs, arguing that the negotiation of development 
concepts is embedded in a translocal space and is leading to the transformation of what is 
defined as local. 
 
Particularly in Muslim societies and specifically after the events of September 11th 2001, 
development concepts are subject to multi-level negotiations for various reasons. One the one 
hand, global development concepts are debated to ensure their compatibility with the so called 
“Islamic identity” advocated by certain groups or by the state. Due to the ongoing 
international discourse and politics towards Islam these concepts become even more 
significant for the articulation of a Muslim identity of a society.  
 
On the other hand global concepts of development are also negotiated by social actors who 
are engaged in the field of civil and political organisations, in order to make these concepts 
relevant to a specific local context. Along the same line goes the negotiation of these concepts 
by women's NGOs, who try to use strategies, form relations, create networks and set new 
discursive and non discursive practices in order to make the global development discourses a 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Lachenmann, Dannecker 2002. 
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local agenda. No less important are the negotiations processes between women’s NGOs and 
the global development agencies. These processes are significant for understanding how 
globalisation works from below and how local interests and specificities are part of the global 
discourse. 
 
The research concentrates on different Muslim societies, Senegal, Malaysia and Sudan, which 
experience different forms of Islamisation. The empirical focus is on female agency and the 
gendered structure of development processes. Various women’s NGOs are studied in the 
respective countries to see how they are engaged in the processes of negotiating global 
development concepts and which strategies they develop and use. At the same time, the 
research seeks to understand how these negotiation processes are leading to the constitution of 
translocal spaces and what relevance such spaces have for the processes of social and political 
transformations in a specific context. 
 
Concerning the methodology2, the research combines a translocal and a networking approach. 
Thereby it is possible to study the interrelatedness of phenomena that are usually 
conceptualised in dichotomic categories like the generalising opposition of local / global, or 
the more empirical notions of civil organisation / state or state / society. Analysing 
comparative interaction is thus important for this approach. The interface approach, which is 
also applied for this research, enables us to study the interactive nature of the process of 
constituting agency. Finally the research follows empirically the relational dimensions of 
different social agents and institutions which might be culturally and geographically distant.  
 
The constitution of space is a middle level approach adopted in the research to link the notion 
of agency to that of social structure. This means for example to examine how the world-views, 
strategies and relations of specific social agents are involved in constructing or deconstructing 
boundaries. The constitution of multidimensional spaces can be comprehended through 
describing how specific localities, built up through discourse, cultural practices and 
knowledge systems, are related. By studying the constitution of various spaces the research is 
retracing the ambiguous nature of the process of social transformation, which implies changes 
both at local and global levels. 
 
                                                 
2
 For more discussion on the research methodology fort this project see (Nageeb 2005), to be published as 
Working paper , Sociology of Development Research Centre, Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld. 
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Another methodological dimension of this research is the comparative framework. By 
comparing different Muslim societies we focus on various forms of networking, development 
discourses and the ways social spaces are constituted. At the same time the comparison hints 
at the specificity of the relations between women’s organisations and other social actors, like 
the state, representatives of local Islam or other civil groups. The comparative approach 
means comparing by contextualising to show how the process of negotiating development is 
embedded in specific translocal and local contexts. Thereby global development debates are 
located in concrete political, historical and social frameworks. On this basis it is possible to 
develop typologies (of women NGOs, gender and Islam discourses, state development 
visions, women activists and interface encounters) which  can be related to the social reality 
in the three different countries and help to outline the translocal dimensions of the process of 
negotiating development. 
 
To give an idea about the different contexts of the research the following sections will focus 
on the major findings of the empirical research. The cases of Malaysia, Senegal and Sudan 
will hence be presented to shed light on the local development discourses, the actors engaged 
in the field of negotiating development, the processes of negotiation and the networking 
relations. In the conclusion the paper will highlight the preliminary results which will be 
considered for comparing the three cases.  
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Malaysia: Negotiating Development in a Limited Democratic Space  

In the following section of this paper the emphasis will lie on the main development concepts 
that are locally negotiated by the civil society organisations in Malaysia and through which 
they are connected to global development discourses.  
 
Development Process in Malaysia: Achievements and New Polarisations 
 
Since independence Malaysia has experienced an unprecedented process of social and 
economic transformation. From a mainly rural society and a colonial economy that 
concentrated on the export of natural resources, namely palm oil, tin, and rubber, it developed 
into an mainly urban society (over 60%) with a diversified industry (Jomo K.S., Edwards 
1993). This development is of course embedded in the changes of the global economic 
system, the new global division of labour, but it is also the result of 40 years of development 
policies of a developmentalist state with ever increasing authoritarian features. Since 
independence Malaysian development policy has always been based on a quantitative growth 
paradigm and rather neglected questions of social justice and equality (Bruton 1992). 
Especially since the 80s this trend got more pronounced and since then growth has been 
promoted not as an instrument for equity, but as a goal per se, even with the cost of producing 
social polarisation and inequality. Economic development went hand in hand with deep social 
transformation: urbanisation, the reshaping of ethnic spaces through the formation of a Malay 
middle class, the reshaping of gendered spaces through an increasing rate of participation of 
Malaysian women in formal economy (Othman 1998, 172), and the emergence of Islamic 
Revivalism and the politicisation of Islam (Camroux 1996; Nagata 1994), which partly got 
incorporated into state policies.3  
 
The result of this kind of development policy has been a relatively successful industrialisation 
and also a general reduction of the overall poverty rate, from 50% in 1973 to 7,8% in 1999.4 
                                                 
3
 Malaysia is a multi-ethnic society. Only little more then 50% of Malaysias citizens are ethnic (‘indigenous’) 
Malay, 34% are of Chinese and about 10% of Indian origin. Nevertheless, the Malaysian nation state is based on 
Malay political and cultural dominance: Malay language is declared official language, Islam is declared state 
religion, furthermore it was constitutionally fixed, that Prime Minister and chief minister of the individual states 
had to be Malay (Nagata 1997, 134). Although MXVVROLV was introduced to convert the migrant population into 
Malaysian citizens, Malay primacy is secured in a series of provisions and policies, as the New Economic Policy 
(Nagata 1994, 69). 
4
 http://www.worldbank.org/eapsocial/countries/malay/pov1.htm 
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The state has been able to discursively and politically monopolise the classical development 
issues, like rural development, within a framework of authoritarian democracy, and has left no 
or little space for civil society and NGO activities (Weiss, Hassan 2003). Despite considerable 
poverty reduction, for instance, the general income inequality remained untouched and is one 
of the highest in the region. So it is also a process which continuously produces new fractions, 
new frictions, and new inequalities in society. An example for these new polarisations in the 
Malaysian society is the situation of the urban poor and plantation workers who settle on land 
that is going to be prepared for the building of industrial or housing complexes and who then 
get evicted from their lands. Another example is the situation of female factory workers 
within the highly oppressive working context of the free trade zones. Still another problem is 
the lack of civil rights, the few possibilities of participatory processes in development and 
politics, and of course issues of gender equality within a context of Islamisation and an 
economy, which is increasingly deregulated.    

These are the issues where NGOs in Malaysia plug themselves into development discourses, 
into the debate on the question about what kind of development is suitable for whom, and 
where they try to carve out democratic space for a public debate. Several, partly ethnically 
defined and to some extent overlapping NGO networks are grouped around a specific topic 
and work on different notions of development: Firstly, the network of a socialist oriented anti-
globalisation movement pushes for the rights of urban poor, plantation workers and female 
factory workers. This network takes up issues related to the uneven economic development 
initiated from above without participation of the population. This movement is mainly Indian 
dominated as the vast majority of plantation workers are of Indian origin. Secondly, the 
network of classical human rights organisations pushes for civil rights, freedom of press and 
democratisation in an authoritarian political regime. And last but not least, the network of 
women’s organisations negotiates question of women’s rights and gender equality. Both, the 
human and the women’s rights organisations are mainly Chinese and to some extent Indian 
dominated. Lately, since the upcoming of the Reformasi movement after the economic crises 
in the late 90s an increases participation of Malay women can be observed, not least because 
of the creation of organisations like Sisters in Islam, to be treated later on.  
 
Whereas the state’s focus lies on economic development with an Islamic (and hence Malay) 
outlook, most NGOs take up discourses with a clear critical perspective towards the 
Malaysian political and societal system. As a consequence there is virtually no co-operation 
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between NGOs and the state and rather a vacuum of NGOs in the classical development field. 
The monopolisation of this classical development area by the state leads to a dual discourse 
and to a certain incompatibility of state and NGO development discourses on the national 
level. Community based social mobilising and advocacy organisations tend to define their 
role as that of critical observers rather than as supporters and implementers of the government 
social development policies. Whereas for socialist oriented anti-globalisation movement and 
the human rights movement the relation with the state takes the form of a more or less open 
confrontation, most of the women’s NGOs choose the strategy of a ‘critical engagement’ with 
the state. This overall distanced and critical perspective of the Indian and Chinese dominated 
NGOs is shaped to a significant extent by the process of nation building in Malaysia, which 
clearly identifies state institutions with Malay identity and which is based on Malay cultural 
and political dominance. 
 
Localising and Globalising Discourses on Women’s Rights 
 
For Malaysian women’s NGOs, campaigns on violence against women within a rights based 
framework are an entry point for negotiations of gender equality with the semi-authoritarian 
state at the local level. At the same time this issue constitutes an important link to a global 
discourse on women’s rights and to a trans-local women’s movement.  

:H ILQGYHU\GLIILFXOWDW WKH ORFDO OHYHO WRXVH WKHZRUGKXPDQULJKWVZKLFK LV VXFKDEDG
ZRUGZKHQ\RXDUHWDONLQJDERXWZRPHQ¶VKXPDQULJKWVZRZ7RFRPPRQHUVRUWRSHRSOH
RQWKHVWUHHWLWLVHTXDOWRDQWLJRYHUQPHQW6R>«@ZHKDYHWRILQGDGLIIHUHQWWHUPLQRORJ\
IRURXUVHOYHV2IFRXUVHYLROHQFHDQGLVVXHVOLNHWKDWDUHHDV\YHU\QLFHLVVXHVWRWDONDERXW
WR VWDUW ZLWK 1RZ XQOHVV \RX DUH UHDOO\ PHHWLQJ ZRPHQ IULHQGV ZKR KDYH EHHQ LQ WKH
PRYHPHQWIRUORQJWLPHEXWLI\RXDUHWDONLQJDERXWWKH\RXQJDFWLYLVWVVRPHRIWKHPPD\EH
DUHQRWFRPIRUWDEOHWRXVHWKHZRUGVµKXPDQULJKW¶RUVD\µ,DPDKXPDQULJKWVDFWLYLVW,DP
DZRPHQ¶VULJKWVDFWLYLVWDWWKHVDPHWLPH¶6REHFDXVHRIWKDWNLQGRIDWPRVSKHUHWREHDEOH
WRSURPRWHWKDWFRQFHSWRIKXPDQULJKWVDPRQJWKH1*2VDQGDOVRWRFHUWDLQZRPHQ¶VJURXS
LWLVYHU\QRWHDV\DWDOOIHPDOHDFWLYLVW
 
In Malaysia, as the analysis of the empirical material has shown, the discourse about violence 
against women, gender equality and women’s rights constitutes a significant site for the 
making of a public space, were women from different ethnic groups can build up solidarity, 
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since this issue had not been part of the hyper-ethnitised politics promoted by the state 
(Mohamad 2002).The transformational potential of this public space, which women’s 
organisations build up through strategies of popularisation of feminist ideas, is grounded in 
the possibility to link gender questions to broader societal issues like democratisation. The 
transformational potential is also related to the high trans-local connectivity, that the discourse 
on violence against women offers. Using this concept, Malaysian women’s groups are 
connected to the global discourse on violence against women, which at the moment seems to 
be very prominent among transnational NGOs, as Amnesty International, the United Nations 
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief 
(OXFAM) are launching global campaigns on violence against women. The most important 
Malaysian women’s organisations working on specific notions of violence against women 
(Women’s Aid Organisation working on domestic violence, All Women’s Action Society 
working on sexualised violence like rape and sexual harassment, Sisters in Islam working on 
violence from an Islamic perspective) are all highly connected with other women’s groups 
especially from other Asian countries. These groups participated at the workshop “Current 
Issues and Challenges in Crisis Intervention Work on Violence against Women” at the “Asia 
Pacific NGO Forum 2004 on Beijing +10” with the aim to develop a feminist approach for 
crisis intervention.  
 
Most women’s groups in Malaysia take up the relevant universal declarations, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to legitimise their work. The Women’s Aid 
Organisation is explicitly undertaking the project to localise CEDAW to the Malaysian 
context. The localisation of these declarations and conventions is embedded within the 
strategies to open up space for political dissent within a limited democratic framework. 
Global conventions are important instruments to pressurise the government to change its 
policies. The negotiations on CEDAW can be analysed as an important interface between the 
women’s movement and the state. “The convention is the tool in areas where we have 
difficulties at the national level, areas that we already work on but that we need to push 
forward”(female activist, 21.08.04).The convention is a source of legitimisation within the 
national context. The global is perceived as giving new power to local actors. Whereas 
women’s organisations work on their own locally and nationally important issues, they still 
need global support to put pressure on the government.  
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Through the networks that women’s organisations establish, global concepts get localised. 
Furthermore, these networks contribute to the constitution of a trans-local space, where 
alternative notions of development or Islam are being shaped. Malaysian NGOs make explicit 
use of trans-local comparisons, links and networks, as they refer to other country examples to 
reflect upon their own situation, to show social problems in the own local context and to 
ground their demands. Trans-local networking can thus be seen as a crucial practice to 
constitute globalised discourses on identity. The Committee for Asian Women, which is a 
regional organisation of female workers, organised a regional workshop on globalisation with 
female workers from Malaysia (mainly Indian women), Thailand, Korea and Sri Lanka 
aiming at empowerment through comparison of different local contexts. Female factory 
workers from the different countries shared their working experiences and discussed about 
cultural and social changes brought by globalisation. Through these regional networks 
discourses, ideas and visions, which are based on specific local knowledge and local 
experiences, are exchanged and a sense of globally effective processes of social change is 
produced.  
 
Sisters in Islam, an organisation of Muslim professional women, who are engaging in the 
debate of women’s rights in Islam by explicitly using religious argumentations, carried out a 
comparative research on different Sharià laws in different Muslim countries in order to 
question the sacred character of these laws and to open up room for manoeuvre. Within the 
CEDAW process different country reports are compared in order to learn about the best 
practices. Global development concepts and the respective treaties and mechanisms are 
positively appropriated by the Malaysian women’s NGOs as tools for gaining power in the 
process of negotiation with the government and other conservative groups. 
 
However, to make these conventions and values effective in the local context, these universal 
declarations and concepts undergo, and have to undergo multiple processes of negotiation, as 
they are rejected by some parts of the population as alien to their specific culture, tradition, or 
religion. Especially the subordination of women is justified as part of tradition and culture. 
Confronted with this kind of difficulties NGOs develop different strategies in order to “bring 
the conventions back home”. One Indian activist, who works especially on a programme on 
violence against women in the Indian community argues. “We cannot talk straight away about 
culture, we cannot take the approach of saying ‘we have our rights’ or ‘these are women’s 
rights’. Because even the women believe that this is our culture. We have to go very slowly 
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asking ’do your children have birth certificate, identity card, is your marriage registered? 
Does it have to be that way? Is our culture a culture of violence? Do we have to accept it?’ So 
we just keep throwing it back to them.” (female Indian activist, 10.07.05) 
 
In this grassroots approach the ‘threatening’ term rights, which might be conceived as alien to 
the local culture and tradition, is avoided and localised through a translation into everyday 
experiences of women. This strategy aims at analysing, questioning and changing the 
meaning of ‘culture’ promoted by one specific group, mainly men, in order to maintain power 
relations. While renegotiating the content of a specific culturally defined identity, the term 
tradition is strategically used and transformed. This implies not only questioning the authority 
of certain definitions of culture but really rewriting culture and history from a feminist point 
of view.  
 
One outstanding example for this strategy is a “Muslim feminism”, as it is put forward by 
Sisters in Islam, who try to advocate for women’s rights on the grounds of religion. This is 
not done by rejecting the universalism of human rights, but rather by building bridges and by 
searching for roots in their own cultural and religious context for these rights and values. 
Because of the institutionalisation of religion through the family law and the increasing 
politicisation of religion in the public sphere, it seems necessary for Muslim women activists 
to develop a strategy that reflects these characteristics, and that enables them to communicate 
successfully with the respective authorities. This strategy consists in “adopting the language 
of the enemy”, as a Malaysian activist argued, in order to deconstruct discriminatory practices 
and ideas that are legitimised by certain interpretations of religious texts. Using religion and 
religious arguments does not necessarily mean opposing secular values or universal human 
rights. It is a reaction and a strategy in a context where only arguments that are deduced from 
the religious texts are recognised as valid knowledge. It seems that in the highly globally and 
trans-locally connected Malaysian NGO scene discourses of othering between Western and 
Asian culture are likely to be rejected. It is rather a notion of global and trans-cultural 
solidarity among women that is prominent among the urban and cosmopolitan NGO activists. 
 
Islamisation and the De-Legitimisation of a Multi-Ethnic Public Sphere 
 
In Malaysia, the process of Islamisation is clearly shaping the constitution of a public sphere. 
This is due to the intertwined constructions of ethnicity and religion in Malaysian multiethnic 
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society. Also discourses and strategies of women’s organisations are shaped by the social 
changes brought by the process of Islamisation. In the specific Malaysian multiethnic and 
multi-religious society Islamisation leads towards the re-enforcement of separate ethnic 
spaces as well as towards the deepening and institutionalisation of ethnic boundaries in all 
aspects of daily life, between Muslims and non-Muslims. This includes also government 
development policies, which differentiate between ethnic groups. The following quotation 
from an interview with an activist from Alaigal, an Indian based grassroots organisation 
clearly shows how housing policies are ethnitised: 
 
3HRSOH WHQG WR FRPSDUH KRZ WKH0DOD\V DOO WKH0DOD\V DUH0XVOLP KRZ WKH0XVOLP JHW
VXEVLGLHVIRUWKLVDQGWKDWKRZLVWKHLUTXRWDIRUWKLVDQGWKDW6RWKHUHLVDQDWXUDOWHQGHQF\
WRFRPSDUH/LNHKHUH LQ ,SRK IRUH[DPSOHZHGRQ¶WKDYHDVLQJOHNDPSXQJ VLQJOH0DOD\
YLOODJH IDFLQJHYLFWLRQ$OODUHYLOODJHVRI ,QGLDQDQG&KLQHVH+HUH WKHVWDWH WDNHVFDUHRI
0DOD\YLOODJHV0D\EH8012QHHGVWKHP7KHUHLVQRSUREOHPDVIDUDV0DOD\YLOODJHVDUH
FRQFHUQHG %XW GHILQLWHO\ WKH ,QGLDQ DQG &KLQHVH KDYH WKH SUREOHP >@ 7KH JRYHUQPHQW
ORRNVDIWHUWKH0DOD\\RXNQRZDQGWKHDQJHULVDOZD\VWUDQVIHUUHGWRWKH0DOD\YLOODJHUV
QRW WR WKHJRYHUQPHQW6RZHKDYHD MRERIJHWWLQJ WKH WKLQJULJKW IRU WKHP:HVHHDUHDO
µGLYLGHDQGUXOH¶SROLF\DSRRU0DOD\YLOODJHUPLJKWJHWDFUXPEKHLVQRWJHWWLQJWKHPDLQ
WKLQJ$QGZK\GRHVKHJHWWKHFUXPE"%HFDXVHWKHV\VWHPGRHVQ¶WZDQWXVWRXQLWH7KDW¶V
WKHPDLQWKLQJ6RWKDWWLPHWKHJRYHUQPHQWWDONVRPXFKDERXWXQLW\DQGKDUPRQ\DQGDOO
WKDW%XWZKHQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW VHWWOHV SHRSOHRQ ODQG KRXVLQJ ODQG LW VHJUHJDWHV$QGZH
KDYHWKHMREWRH[SODLQWRWKHSHRSOH<HVWKHUHDUHSROLFLHVGHILQLWHO\DQGLWGRHVPDNHLW
KDUGHU IRU XV WRPRELOLVH7U\ WR JHW0DOD\V LQ LW LVQRW WKDW HDV\ ,QGLDQ IHPDOH DFWLYLVW
 
 
This passage illustrates the institutionalisation of ethnic identities within state development 
policies and shows how this institutionalisation re-enforces the image of a Malay ownership 
of the state. Furthermore, the quotation reveals one of the most critical consequences of the 
process of the state driven Islamisation: the de-legitimisation of the idea of an inter-ethnic, 
inter-cultural and inter-religious public sphere. Alaigal is member of the Movement of 
Oppressed People, a socialist oriented network that comprises indigenous groups, Indian 
plantation workers and as well as Malay rice farmers and urban squatters. Although this 
multiethnic network manages to build up solidarity across ethnic lines on specific issues, e.g. 
within campaigns criticising national housing programmes, the solidarity remains on fragile 
 12
grounds, as the interview shows. Because of the perceived differences in the treatment of 
different ethnic groups by state authorities, it is especially difficult to establish solidarity 
between Indian plantation worker who are evicted from their lands and Malay villagers. 
 
This trend of a ethnically divided public sphere is also relevant for the women’s movement. 
On the one hand, it became particularly difficult for non-Muslims to talk about issues 
concerning Islam and social changes related to Islamisation. On the other hand the inner-
Islamic discourse itself is extremely dominated by traditional male religious authorities, who 
claim knowledge about the ‘true’ and ‘only’ Islam. Muslim women are not entitled to engage 
in this discourse because in principle only men are recognised as religious experts, not to 
mention non-Muslim. This creates special problems for a cosmopolitan women’s movement. 
Women activists start to create alternative modes of knowledge and expertise, questioning the 
authority of conservative, male, academic Islamic scholars. Their new expertise is based on 
everyday life experiences. Their legitimisation to engage in the public sphere is brought 
forward on the basis of experiencing the consequences of gender discrimination. The creation 
of separate NGOs for Muslim women and the “adopting the language of the enemy”- strategy 
can be seen as another solution for this dilemma. Muslim women in other Muslim societies, 
where religion is not that politicised as a marker of ethnic boundaries, can more easily argue 
from a secular perspective and even refuse to argue from a religious perspective. In Malaysia 
it seems to be rather difficult for Malay women to adopt a secular perspective because of the 
inflation of religious and ethnic identity.  
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Senegal: Grounding Global Development Concepts 
 
What are the main development issues in Senegal and how are global development concepts 
negotiated in local arenas? To answer these questions it is necessary to get first of all an idea 
of the political, economic and socio-cultural context, before turning to the main actors and 
development issues. Finally, by focussing on a specific interface, the process of grounding the 
concepts of gender equality and rights among local women’s associations will be analysed. 
 
The “Social Contract” Between the Secular State and Local Muslim 
Brotherhoods 
 
When Senegal became independent in 1960 the constitutional and legal structures of the state 
were transplanted in all essential respects from the French system. Its commitment to the 
principles of secularism has never wavered, with one exception: the highly contested Family 
Code, which contains an option for Muslims to follow a version of Islamic law, adapted from 
the Sharià. The Senegalese state stands for a western oriented modernisation project, guided 
in the beginning by Senghor’s idea of “African socialism” - a vision that has in the meantime 
been replaced by the principles of globalised liberalism. Since 1981 a multi-party-system is 
established and especially since the elections in 2000, when opposition leader Abdoulaye 
Wade became president, the hope that a democratisation process would start was rising. 
 
Senegal is a predominant Muslim society (with 95% of the population declaring themselves 
Muslim), and experiencing an ongoing Islamisation process. The dominant forms of local 
Islam are the Sufi-brotherhoods, that are internally differentiated (the most important are the 
Tidjanes and Murides). This contributes to a religious pluralism that is part of the Senegalese 
national identity, which is characterised by cultural pluralism, and ethnic and linguistic 
diversity. All these symbolic systems overlap within the complex stratifications of society. 
Which features of identity are actually dominating depends on the situative context - ethnic or 
religious boundaries become only partly relevant and have never played any significant role in 
the election processes. 
 
What has in contrast been very important during the elections in Senegal is the so called 
“social contract” (Cruise O'Brien  1992) between the state and the marabouts, the 
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representatives of the local Muslim brotherhoods. The local brotherhoods manage the 
relations between the mostly rural population and the government, for example in terms of 
votes or paying taxes. In return they receive from the state political protection and economic 
advantages that are partly redistributed to the population. This system of patron client 
relations, based on a consensual strategy of non-confrontation, has been a guarantee for 
stability - although the societal projects of the two actors of the contract seem quite 
incompatible: the western modernisation project pushed forward by the secular state on the 
one side, and the maintenance of Islamic tradition by the dominant Sufi orders on the other. 
 
But obviously these different visions of development are negotiated at different interfaces and 
in social spaces that are cautiously kept apart. These spaces are differentiated symbolically 
through the use of language: French (the official language) by the government, Wolof (the 
most widely spoken national language) or other local languages and categorical rejection of 
French by the local Sufi Islam. There is also a differentiation in the sense of physical space: 
The modern state being associated with the urban centre of Dakar, its administrative buildings 
and symbols of western capitalism, whereas the Sufi tradition is more intimately related to the 
rural areas, where the majority of the population (almost 60%) lives.  
 
However, the distinction between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ is a symbolic one that 
tends to obscure the fact that the two sides interact and take active part in the process of social 
transformation. The state has left its marks in the administrative structures of the rural 
communities and the brotherhoods have their own urban symbols of power, where the seats of 
the respective general Khalifs are located and annual pilgrimages take place. The most salient 
example is Touba, the holy city of the Murides, that has become the second important 
economic centre of the country (unofficially, as its economic potential relies mostly on extra- 
and illegal structures, cf. Guèye 2002). 
 
Nowadays the “social contract” is put into question by the growing dissatisfaction of the 
population. This might be the chance for a third development project represented by the 
reformist Islamic movement. It can be characterized by the vision of a translocal Islam, that is 
negotiated at different levels of society, mainly in the academic milieu, but not restricted to 
educated elites. Its critique not only of state promoted ‘westernisation’ but also of the ‘un-
Islamic’ practices of the established local brotherhoods is very present in public discourses. 
Only partially institutionalised, the reformist Islamic project is constantly changing faces and 
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socially much more heterogeneous than state-modernism or Sufi-traditionalism. It gains 
importance due to the declining power of the marabouts in terms of their spiritual authority 
and the inability of the state to come to grips with the ongoing economic crisis. 
 
Conceptualising Development: Issues and Actors 
 
The Senegalese economy, based on agriculture (mainly groundnut, rice, cotton), fishing and 
phosphate, experiences a unprecedented crisis since periods of severe droughts in the 70ies, 
the implementation of structural adjustment programs and the devaluation of the CFA franc in 
1994. Demographically this has lead to a rural exodus, massive migration and a process of 
urbanisation without industrialisation. In spite of the massive engagement of international 
donors and the efforts of the Senegalese state to fulfil “international standards” the basic 
problem remains poverty. Actually an estimated 54% of the population is living under the soil 
of poverty. This determines the main development agenda: poverty reduction, with a special 
focus on women, as they are classified as the most “vulnerable” group (by the government as 
well as NGOs). 
 
Important development issues that are immediately related to poverty-reduction are education 
(illiteracy rate among women is almost 70%) and health (also predominantly concerning 
women especially in the domains of reproductive health and HIV/AIDS prevention – although 
the rate is low, the tendency is towards a feminisation of the disease). Development projects 
in these domains address mainly women. Almost all projects include micro-finance-
programmes, aimed to facilitate income-generating activities, as it is assumed that without the 
perspective of an economic profit women would not participate in adult literacy training or in 
consciousness raising campaigns. Although the micro-finance approach has been criticised 
because of the high level of interest rates and low remunerations, it is still maintained and 
perpetuated in local initiatives to provide social security through decentralized financial 
structures, such as credit and saving groups.  
 
The structures of local poverty-reduction projects contribute to the large associative sector, 
that is particular for Senegal. Women play a significant role in this sector although they don’t 
constitute a single force. Their participation can be characterised by diverse interests and their 
organisational structures are embedded in different social spaces. An important dimension is 
the peasant movement, which has been strongly supported by women (the majority of the 
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members being women, Lachenmann et al. 1990, XVIII). It emerged in the 70ies, with 
autonomous village-based associations that were unified in a national federation (FONGS). 
On the local level it overlaps with the heterogeneous female associative movement.  
 
The landscape of women organisations in Senegal is vast, comprising a pluralism of structures 
that are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily connected. Most recurrent are so-called 
‘traditional’ female associations, based on kinship, affinity, locality or field of activity – like 
age groups, neighbourhood or village associations, mutual savings groups or associations 
based on shared religious practice. Alongside these informal patterns of social organisation, a 
range of formal structures exist, which are recognised by the state. To be able to relate to the 
government or other development institutions women have to get registered either as a kind of 
non-profit organisation, ranging from simple “groupements de promotion féminine” (GPF) to 
NGOs, or in an association with economic interest, like the widespread “groupements 
d’interêt économique” (GIE), that links the organisation to the formal economic sector.  
 
Supporting the formation of GPFs to mobilise women, especially in rural areas, has been an 
essential part of the state’s development politics. Women’s advancement (“la promotion 
feminine”) was an important ideological element in the nation-building-process since 
Senghor, serving at the same time as a legitimising strategy for the government in power 
(Lachenmann 2001b, 85). Several national structures and institutions were founded and 
established with this intention. The first National Action Plan for Senegalese Women (“Plan 
d’action national de la femme sénégalaise”) was elaborated in 1982, and in 1990 a ministry in 
charge of the condition of women and children was created, which then has been given 
diverse appellations and is most commonly identified as the ministry of family (current 
appellation: “Ministère de la famille, du développement social et de la solidarité nationale”). 
 
Nevertheless, women as producers and economic actors have been roughly neglected by the 
state as well as the international donor agencies, and the perspectives of an economic 
advancement, through the formation of GIEs and the integration in national or regional 
economic development plans, almost exclusively oriented towards the male population 
(Lachenmann 2001b, 88; Lachenmann 2001a, 204). The majority of female associations, 
formal as well as informal organisations, although economically motivated, are concentrating 
on securing livelihood on a day to day basis and are rather conservative concerning the social 
and gender order. Thereby the marginalisation of female economy is perpetuated. 
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The rising of the Senegalese women’s movement since the 70ies thus constitutes a counter-
force, challenging the established gender-order and calling for the transformation of society. 
The international context of the first world conference on women (Mexico 1975) and the 
following UN women’s decade has deeply influenced its formation. At a later stage the 
Beijing conference (1995) and its preparatory process during the African platform, held in 
Dakar in 1994 gave important impulses to its dynamics, organisational structures and 
networks. Whereas the fight for women’s rights and access to positions of decision making 
became quite an important issue for Senegalese NGOs, the more general issue of human 
rights was never really a hot topic in Senegal (president Wade has been decorated in 2004 by 
the International League of Human Rights for his efforts in the defence of Human Rights). 
 
Senegal has ratified all the international conventions about eliminating any form of 
discrimination against women (CEDAW ratified in 1985 without reservations, the protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women ratified in 2004) 
and has also adopted laws penalizing violence against women. There is not much difference 
between the agenda of NGOs and the state - in the “National Action Plan for Women” one 
can find for example the same objectives and strategies as in the programs of the most 
prominent women NGOs. This is due to a very strong donor orientation of the state and the 
NGOs. At the same time they are engaged in a strategic partnership to compete the influence 
of popular Islamic movements. Although in the national legislation some clauses still exist 
that contradict the CEDAW convention, both the government and the NGOs actually blame 
the local socio-cultural patterns as the major constraint for women to claim their rights.  
 
Negotiating Gender Equality in Terms of Women’s Rights  
 
The manifold interrelations that exist between state and civil society in Senegal make it very 
difficult to draw a clear boundary between the respective domains. A telling example for the 
joint effort of government and civil society to establish a certain vision of development is the 
recent paper concerning the new “National Strategy for Equity and Gender Equality in 
Senegal” (“Stratégie Nationale pour l’Égalité et l’Équité de Genre au Sénégal”: SNEEG, 
République du Sénégal 2005). It has been elaborated with the support of the United Nations 
Fund for Population (UNFPA/Senegal) in a cooperation of diverse ministries, together with 
political parties, syndicates, a range of national and international NGOs, networks and various 
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international donor institutions. The strategy paper is a continuation of a process that started 
with the study on “Senegalese Women by the Year 2015” (République du Sénégal / Ministère 
de la Femme de l'Enfant et de la Famille 1993), funded by the UN. The study reflected on the 
main weaknesses of the National Action Plan for Senegalese Women and its application, that 
had been revealed by an assessment in 1990. 
 
The SNEEG aims at linking up with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), covering 
the same period of planning. By taking up the essential criticisms concerning the insufficient 
gender approach of the PRSP as well as the former National Action Plan for Women, the 
SNEEG is explicitly formulated to fit to a “global frame of reference”, as constituted for 
example by the Beijing Conference on women, the Millennium Goals and the New Economic 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). It is based on an account of the general 
socio-cultural, economic and political context, which it is claimed to present an “analysis of 
the actual situation concerning equity and gender equality in Senegal”. However, the paper is 
hardly analytical as it does refer to the notion of “gender” and mentions some basic facts 
concerning the “fundamental inequality” between men and women, but does not really 
explore gender relations and concrete policy issues and institutions. Thus in its outlook the 
SNEEG refers to a global development discourse and responds to the expectations of 
Senegal’s international partners but hardly includes any reflection on the dynamics at the 
interfaces with local organisations, which are actually involved in the implementation of 
national legislation and development plans. 
 
The problems of such outward and image oriented politics become evident in the process of 
‘translating’ the official development concepts into local discourses. A telling example is the 
ongoing discussion concerning the reform of the Family Code, however, not mentioned in the 
SNEEG. Yet it constitutes a domain in which women’s organisations, NGOs and trade unions 
have been consistently engaged, notably since the mid-eighties. Since its ratification in 1972 
the code has been highly contested, and the efforts for its implementation by the state have 
been mostly unsuccessful. De facto the code is largely ignored by the population and treated 
as something alien to local culture and religion. It is associated with Western feminism and 
called by its opponents the “Women’s Code”. 
 
In 2005 the most important national network of women’s NGOs in Senegal, the “Réseau 
Siggil Jigeen” (which had significantly participated in the elaboration of the above mentioned 
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strategy paper on equity and equality), launched a nation-wide campaign for the modification 
of the code in the sense of implementing the notion of gender equality. A central topic for the 
intended reform is the concept of family authority, which should be changed from “paternal 
authority” to “parental authority”, addressing both father and mother as responsible for the 
children. Another aspect is the modification of an article that regulates financial rights and 
duties, which are still unequal.  
 
An essential strategy in the NGO-campaign is the use of a religious argumentation, elaborated 
by “progressive” Islamic scholars on the basis of Qur’an interpretations. The state adopts the 
same strategy, although using not only a Muslim but also a Christian argumentation for 
gender equality, in order to maintain a balanced position towards the different religions and 
avoid any direct confrontation with Islamic authorities. In any case the reference made to 
theological interpretations is significant because otherwise the dimension of religion is very 
carefully left out in national development discourse, be it articulated by the state or by NGOs.  
 
In the course of the campaign for gender equality, discussions with local women’s groups 
were organised all over the country to popularise the knowledge about the Family Code and 
the arguments for its reform. In one of these discussions, which had been organised among 
members of a GPF in a suburban quarter of Kaolack (a city in the central region of Senegal) 
the notion of gender equality was introduced by the local NGO activist as follows: 
 
:HGRQ¶WZDQWHTXDOLW\ZHZDQW WREHJLYHQRXUULJKWVEHFDXVHZHSD\«>VKHH[SODLQV
ZRPHQSD\PRUHWD[HVWKHQPHQZRPHQJLYHELUWKEXWFDQQRWGHFODUHWKHLUFKLOGUHQFDUH
IRUWKHPHPEHUVRIWKHIDPLO\EXWFDQQRWDVVXPHWKHLUUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIILFLDOO\HWF@:KHQ
ZHVSHDNRIHTXDOLW\ LW LVQRWHTXDOLW\LQVKRUWEXW WKHHTXDOLW\RIULJKWVEHFDXVH*RGKDV
FUHDWHGXVGLIIHUHQW
 

 
What becomes clear in these formulations: The speaker – by the way the local representative 
of “Women in Law and Development in Africa” (WILDAF), a pan-African network for 
women’s rights and development – rejects the abstract idea of equality. When talking to the 
local women’s group, she asserts the essential differences between men and women as an 
unquestionable given (by God). At the same time she brings forward the notion of rights, 
                                                 
5
 “Si on parle d’égalité ce n’est pas l’égalité tout court, mais l’égalité de droit, car Dieu nous a créé différents.” 
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understood as something acquired through social and economic interactions (but not as 
automatically given to everybody by the state’s constitution or an international convention).  
 
Women’s rights are discussed here in terms of concrete social practices and a locally 
grounded logic of reciprocity, which characterise the interactions of the participants who are 
all not only members of the formally constituted GPF, but also of diverse informal female 
associations. Thereby the women know very well about each other’s social and economic 
situation. They discuss their family problems and build up networks in which social security 
is assured through moral obligations. In mutual savings groups, where social control is quite 
severe, but also in age groups, neighbourhood or religious associations, rules exist which 
determine the rights and duties of the members. With the notion of “equality of rights” the 
women thus appropriate a global vision, by giving it a meaning which refers to their own way 
of handling the local reality of ongoing social transformations and changing family structures 
due to the economic conditions, they all experience and share with each other. 
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Sudan: Negotiating Development and the State Islamist Identity 

“Building the Sudan of Peace” represents the slogan that reveals the local visions and 
discourses on development. The phrase is increasingly used, particularly after the signing of 
the Peace agreement between the North and South of Sudan in January 2005 in Naivasha, 
Kenya. This agreement ends a civil war that lasted for more than two decades. According to 
this agreement Sudan will be governed for six year by a transitional government where the 
political power is shared between the National Islamic Front (NIF), which is the party 
currently ruling Sudan, and the Sudanese People Liberation Movement (SPLM). After the 
transitional period Sudan will have to face the question of unity or separation between the 
North and the South. The local development agendas are more or less based on activating 
Naivasha's six protocols, particularly those related to the changes in the political system and  
the division of wealth between the North and the South. 
 
In order to understand the nature of the engagement of civil organisations in general and 
women's NGOs in particular in the process of negotiating development one should refer to the 
translocal context in which the local agenda of development is embedded. The peace 
agreement was realised after intensive international pressures on both parties, the government 
of NIF in the north and the SPLM. However this pressure became only effective after the 
events of September 11th . 
.
One could say that the events of the September 11th and their global consequences in the sense 
of “war against terrorism” marked a change in the nature of the regime in Sudan. The regime 
is attempting to negotiate its Islamist identity by opening up for a more democratic system 
that gives room for the participation of other political and civil factions. At the same time the 
opening up of Sudan for international investment particularly in the newly booming oil 
business necessitates reforms of the economic policies to support the move to privatisation 
and to make the market policies more attractive for international investors. Additionally there 
is also a tendency to change the general political environment to make the country more 
attractive for such economic activities.  
 
Simultaneously, the acceleration of the situation in Darfur is putting Sudan and the Sudanese 
regime more and more under the focus of the international community. The Darfur conflict 
opened an international discussion on the possibility of UN sanctions, should the government 
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of Sudan prove to be not cooperative and serious about the disarming of the militant groups
Thus it is no wonder to feel and see the change in the general political and cultural outlook of 
the country compared to the situation in the 1990s. There are huge numbers of NGOs and 
civil society organisations increasingly engaging in various political and developmental 
activities. Furthermore the international organisations are more interested, active and present 
in Sudan. At the same time various restrictive laws and policies, like the emergency law, are 
deactivated, which allow such a political change to take place.  
 
The opening up of the political atmosphere as well as the interest of donors’ agencies in 
supporting the peace building process is leading to an ambiguous situation: on the one hand 
there is a general feeling of hope, excitement and a positive perception of these changes, on 
the other hand there is also an attitude of doubtfulness and uncertainness, which is related to 
the internal politics of the regime. Most of the people in Sudan are concerned whether the 
peace agreement could ever bring democracy to Sudan, since the NIF regime considers itself 
as an umbrella which can shelter all other political parties. Another reason for the general 
doubtfulness around the planned political changes is related to the privatisation policy which 
NIF is following. Through this policy NIF members are considered to be the main and real 
controllers of the market. Whether they will be active as members of the government or not, 
the economic power they accumulated will grant them an influential political role in Sudan's 
political scenery in the future.    
 
However, this feeling of ambiguity is not only grounded in the nature of the local political and 
economic structures, but it is also translocally embedded. To understand its translocal 
dimension one needs to refer to the conflict in Darfur. Locally the excitement with peace is 
“muddied” by the conflict in Darfur. The Darfur conflict brings another concern to the 
picture. Mainly there is a conspiracy discourse about the presence and interest of the 
international community in Sudanese affairs. Basically this is related to the USA policies in 
the region and in particularly in the Muslim world. Through this conspiracy discourse the 
issue of the policy of the US towards Iraq and Afghan is often revised to explain the role of 
the international community in the local affairs. The strong media campaign of the USA on 
the conflict in Darfur is perceived by many Sudanese as a strategy to calm down the debates, 
especially inside the USA, on the shortcomings of the US war in Iraq. In addition this 
discourse is also supported by an economic view relating the interest of Bush's administration 
in Darfur's issue to a hidden agenda of the US to compete with the growing Chinese interest 
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in Africa. One of the biggest investment sites for China nowadays is Sudan. This expanded 
economic interest and military relation of the Chinese in Africa is considered to be disturbing 
to the US administration, accordingly, it is often said that  the US tries to find a way to control 
the international relations at this part of the continent more efficiently. This discourse can be 
found among various social groups, from the religious extremist to the liberal groups.   
 
Within this political context the local development agendas and discourses are formulated and 
negotiated in Sudan. That is to say various development debates and discourses are adopted 
by various women’s NGOs in Sudan. To understand the nature of these variations one need to 
embed the development debates in both the local and translocal political context. 
 
Local Development Discourses 

Currently the most pressing development agenda for both the state and civil organisations are 
the formation of a new government including the SPLM as partner in governing Sudan, the 
preparation for election and institutionalisation of a democratic system, and the writing of the 
new constitution. Among women’s NGOs the development debates are also focusing on these 
issues. Thus the most urgent discourses could be classified in the four categories according to 
the organisations involved and their translocal networking strategies. These discourses are: 
firstly the discourse on “engendering” politics in general, which aims at the promotion of 
equal participation of women in the different political agenda for the peace building phase. 
The second discourse is the one on Violence Against Women (VAW). It gained special 
importance particularly after the publishing of various human rights reports on the cases of 
rape in the region of Darfur. The third discourse is focusing on peace, and aiming at 
emphasising the role of women in peace making. The forth is a poverty related discourse.  In 
the sections to follow each of these discourses, the actors involved and the various networking 
relations will be elaborated on. 
 
Engendering Democracy 

“Engendering democracy”, “engendering the election”, “engendering peace” or “engendering 
the constitution” are all discourses and concepts that various women's NGOs are adopting in 
urban areas and in particular in the capital. Mostly these NGOs are working in fields like legal 
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aid, advocacy, research and training and with a Gender and Development (GAD) approach. 
They belong to the locally called “liberal” organisations or activists (see Nageeb 2005). Both 
the debates and the programmes of these organisations are including wide variations of issues 
such as human and women's rights, gender mainstreaming, gender equality, gender and 
conflict, gender and politics, or gender and peace. They work with global development 
concepts and they are very critical about the state and its Islamist outlook, identity and 
politics. In a way one could say that these organisations are competing with the state to insure 
that their agendas are included. But also because their basic assumption is that the politics of 
the state are not sensitive to women and gender visions, nor democratic. Nowadays these 
organisations network strongly with women groups and NGOs from the Maghreb area, Egypt 
and some other Arabic countries. For the engendering debate a dominant strategy these 
groups are using is to refer to experiences of other Muslim countries or groups in changing 
the legal, political, economic or administrative structures in a gender sensitive way. This is 
considered by many activists as an important strategy to negotiate the engendering vision 
within the frame of an Islamist regime and politics. However, throughout the research other 
forms of networking with groups from Europe or USA were also observable. Nevertheless, 
concerning negotiation strategies, the reference to Muslim contexts is considered to be the 
major one. The activities of these groups are leading to the differentiation of the local 
discourses on Islam. They refer to Islamic contexts, sources and interpretations to argue in 
favour of global development concepts.  
 
It is interesting to note that among the Islamist activists or organisations which take part in 
activities related to the above discourses a new group of “liberal Islamists” women, as they 
call themselves, is emerging. These are few activists and organisations, nevertheless 
significant, in the sense that their vision of Islam is all inclusive rather than competitive with 
the global development concepts. Compared to other Islamist women they do not reject the 
global development concepts.  One of the Islamist women argues “It is all in Islam; we just 
have to understand it right and not reject it without having really engaged ourselves in trying 
to deeply understand it.” The “liberal Islamists” have a different standpoint, they  arguing as 
follows “why not accept the global concepts, we as Muslim have to open up for these things. 
The world is moving fast and we have to move with it.  Islam has to change and keep on 
changing otherwise it will be a dead language” explained on of the activists. 
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In other words the discourse of the Islamist advocates for returning to the “origin” or the 
“texts” which is considered to include everything women need. The discourse of the “liberal 
Islamist” women on the other side, is advocating the opening up of the origin, in the sense of 
continuously engaging in interpreting the texts according to the global changes and modern 
need of Muslims particularly Muslim women. It is extremely interesting to observe how these 
activists argue for global development concepts and how they are forming alliances with 
liberal women activists. Being identified as Islamists and even NIF members they were more 
open and confrontational in arguing and debating the need to adopt global development 
concepts as enrichment for the democratisation process and the building of the new Sudan. 
 
Violence Against Women  

Another development discourse adopted by the liberal groups of women's NGOs is VAW. 
Particularly after the explosion of the conflict in Darfur and the deterioration of women 
human rights situation due to the cases of rapes, violence against women is representing an 
important agenda. This discourse, nevertheless, includes various issues like Female 
Circumcision (FC)/ Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), forced marriage and recently as 
mentioned before the issue of rape. Various local networks are working on these issues. Some 
of these networks are registered, meaning they paid the fees, fulfilled the legal and 
administrative requirements of the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the state body 
responsible for registration and follow up of the activities of the civil society organisations. 
Some other networks are not registered, basically to avoid the expensive and complicated 
procedures of registration. As well being unregistered, many activists argued, keeps their 
networking relations freer and decreases the possibility of control from the state. Translocally 
the violence against women agendas could be considered as the issue which is most 
intensively networked with other women's NGOs. Specifically significant are the networks 
with women's NGOs from societies which have the same practices like FC/FGM. The 
networking with African women's NGOs is viewed by many Sudanese activists to be 
important. “Arab societies which have the same practices are even more conservative than the 
Sudanese, we better work with the African groups as their gender and sexual codes are surely 
better than that of Arabs” explained an activist. However for the issue of rape in Darfur there 
exists strong networking with various human rights organisation in and outside the continent.  
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Locally, many of these debates associated with liberal women’s organisations are opposed 
especially by traditional authorities, some state and none state religious authorities or by 
activists who belong to Islamist movements. Usually the argument against such development 
discourses like violence against women, or CEDAW are based on relating these development 
concepts to a conspiracy theory used by some to explain the relation between the ‘West’ and 
the ‘Islam’. Particularly in the context of Darfur conflict some religious leaders make it even a 
“a duty of all Muslims to fight these notions that bring a cold type of colonisation to the 
Muslim countries”, as argued by a well known 6FKHLFNK about CEDAW while giving a 
Friday's sermon. The major strategies of the so-called liberal organisations in this context is to 
use the ideas of other “enlightened” religious authorities and to refer to certain local Islamic 
figures who can argue that Islam is not against the specific global development concept. By 
following the negotiation of global development concepts, one could clearly observe different 
types of Islam discourses active in the public space.  
 
To understand the nature of these discourses it is worth referring to the every-day negotiation 
strategies of these groups. To “survive” under the frame of an Islamist regime many of the 
liberal women refer to local “traditional” Islam to compete with the global Islamist discourse 
of the state. A leftist activist explained this by referring to a confrontational encounter 
between staff of her organisation and security men. She said “I told the security boys who 
came to confiscate our office and search for documents which contains ideas against the state 
as they believe, I told them that you cannot be Sudanese and you cannot be Muslims ...” In 
various occasions women referred to this discourse on Sudanese 0XVOLPQHVV as opposed to 
“forging” or global Islam. Another activist explained this discourse by saying “the Muslim 
Sudanese would respect women and not harass them, these practices [of harassing liberal 
activists] are belonging to this forging Islam.”  In their every-day life practices these activists 
often refer to the “traditional” Islam of their mothers and grandmothers, or to a Sudanese 
Islam that is different from the global Islam. In this way they are able to negotiate their 
identity and their development agenda. Of similarly importance is the way they transform the 
discourse on “traditional” Islam. The transformation takes place as a result of including global 
development concepts and values in the frame of a “traditional” Sudanese Islam. 
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Women and Peace 

The discourse on peace, which includes peace and development, engendering peace, and 
women/gender and peace, could represent a third category or type of development agenda. In 
this category one can find all types of local NGOs whether “liberal”, Islamist, government 
affiliated or not, rural and urban. NGOs involved in networks around peace and development 
are working in different fields. Some of them are particularly focusing on peace. These are 
mostly newly formed NGOs which came to existence during or directly after the process of 
peace negotiations. While some others are old NGOs who are working on various issues 
related to poverty alleviation, income generation or rural development.  
 
Many of the locally registered networks are constituted with reference to the peace discourses. 
Most of the networking goes through the Dutch Embassy who, through the Women and 
Development desk, took the initiative of forming the first and biggest network for women and 
peace. Women's groups from war or conflict regions are also included in these networks. 
Various other organisations who are closely working with the state and who are known to be 
led by NIF female activists are members in these networks. The peace agenda of women's 
organisations can be seen as a development agenda which is not highly challenged by the 
state. On the contrary the role of women in the peace process is often highlighted by members 
of the government to emphasise a popular, and not only state controlled, character of the 
peace negotiations. Particularly the regime and SPLM are often criticised by political activists 
for having dominated the peace negotiations and left little space for other political factions to 
influence the writing of the agreement and the negotiation for peace. In addition after signing 
the agreement the regime is attempting to enlarge the space for other civil groups to 
participate in the peace process. This step is also significant for NIF to communicate a 
democratic image of the state to the international community.  
 
Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace (SWEP), the network incited by the Dutch 
embassy, was able to send representatives as observers to the peace negotiations in Kenya. 
Such activities are part of the peace groups agenda, however their focus also include 
“engendering all the post-peace programs, be it rehabilitation, rebuilding or resettlement 
work”, as explained an activist in SWEP. What is interesting to mention here is that most of 
the newly registered women's NGOs which are founded by women who are members or 
sympathisers of NIF are working in the area of peace. Some activists consider this as a 
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“dangerous development in the NGO scenery, now these groups will get all the facilitation 
needed from the government, they will be the first to participate in conferences, the first to get 
funded. But they are actually governmental and they work more for the government than they 
do for women.” 
 
Poverty and Poverty Related Discourses 
 
“Fighting poverty”, “fighting illiterateness” and/or “fighting illnesses” are considered to be 
development discourses of women's NGOs who are working mostly with  Women in 
Development (WID) or Women and Development (WAD) approaches. These groups are 
widely spread in both urban as well as rural areas. They are focusing basically on income 
generating activities and awareness raising programmes. Some of them, like the General 
Sudanese Women's Union (GSWU), with its 27 branches all over the country, is working 
closely with the various institutions of the state. They advocate their activities as directed to 
“fill in the gaps of the state”, explained the head of the union in a TV interview. Thus the 
union intensively cooperates with the ministry of social affairs which also include a women 
affairs department. This organisation is considered to be the umbrella organisation and the 
official representative for women's NGOs. The political power of the GSWU is observably 
more than that of other groups. Their position goes more along the side of the conspiracy 
discourse explaining the interest of the international community in Sudan/ Darfur. Hence, 
when faced with the issue of rape in Darfur in a TV interview in Aljazira channel, the leader 
of the GSWU attempted to create doubts around the human rights reports about such cases. 
She emphasised that rape in general is a crime against women and humanity. Nevertheless, 
when she was criticised by some other activists she defended the official rather than the 
position of women's groups. She used the conspiracy discourse to explain the interest of – 
Western – human rights organisations in shaping a specific image about Sudan. Many of 
those active in local human rights organisations and in the area of violence against women do 
not share this opinion. 
 
The union takes part in various state programmes as the representative of women's interests 
and women's groups. However this opinion is not shared by many NGOs who belong to the so 
called “liberal” groups and consider the GSWU as representing the state but not women's 
interests. The networking of GSWU with NGOs which belong to the Islamist groups and to 
Church organisations is strong. The union as well as some other groups, which are engaged in 
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poverty reduction work, are combining their activities with missionary activities, be it of 
Islamic or Christian nature. Obviously the types of activities related to poverty reduction are 
not representing a challenge to the state or its women’s politics. Yet this is not to give the 
impression that these groups are isolated from other development debates and discourses (as a 
matter of fact there is a strategic alliance between for example GSWU and some of the none 
Islamist NGOs). Rather it is emphasised that the approach that the GSWU follows is different 
and mostly representing a traditional approach to women’s issues. Additionally many of the 
groups belonging to this category are active in various networks like peace, FC/FGM and 
reproductive health networks. By studying these networking relations it becomes clear that 
one of the strategies of negotiation the Islamist women are using is co-option of global 
development discourses. This means they might advocate the same concept, using the Arabic 
translation of the term such as the Arabic term ³(QVLDE HOPDUjD´ which means “gender 
mainstreaming”, whereas almost all the liberal organisation use the English term. In addition 
to Arabising the terms, they give it an Islamic frame and advocate it along the line of 
“reserving our Muslim identity.” A university lecturer active in the field of women and 
development commented about this strategy of negotiation saying “the Islamist women they 
don't only Arabise terms, they evacuate the feminist concepts from their global frame and 
identity and give them an Islamic one.”  In this way they are contributing to the 
transformation of the state discourse on Islam by making it inclusive rather than exclusive of 
global development concepts.  
 
Indeed there are various other global development concepts which are adopted by women's 
NGOs as a local agenda. Concepts like legal rights, women's human rights, CEDAW, 
reproductive and sexual rights, HIV/AIDS are specifically the interest of women's groups in 
urban areas. However in this paper the focus was on the development discourses which were 
directly related to the current development agenda of Sudan, i.e. the post-conflict building 
phase. In addition most of the groups engaged in the previously mentioned issues are also 
taking part in activities or networks related to engendering democracy, violence against 
women and peace and their related discourses and activities.  
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Some Reflections on the Comparative Approach: A Conclusion 

Having discussed the three country cases of this project it is important to reflect the 
comparative dimensions for the analysis of the three cases of Malaysia, Sudan and Senegal. 
There are three preliminary dimensions for comparison which became clear after the 
conduction of the field work. The first dimension refers to the different types of Islamisation 
processes. The issue of Islamisation represents an important aspect of structuring the 
negotiation of development concepts. Furthermore it is significant for the analysis of the 
interrelated processes of social transformations taking place in Muslim societies. The second 
dimension for comparison is constituted by the main development agendas of the respective 
states. The focus will be on how the development agenda of the state is structuring the 
discourses of women’s NGOs. Significant also is to analysis the kind of spaces which are 
constituted by social agents while negotiating the development agenda of the state.  The third 
dimension for comparison is the notion of ‘rights’ used by women NGOs in the different 
contexts. These notions of ‘rights’ in addition to the various spaces and networks which are 
constituted by women NGOs while negotiating them will be compared and contextualised
 
To start with the first dimension, in Malaysia the Islamisation project is steered by the 
government and largely shaped by the interaction between the government and the Islamist 
opposition. It is embedded into the ambiguities of a nation building process in a multiethnic 
society and carried out in the language of political ethnicity. The simultaneity of a state driven 
Islamisation, affirmative action programmes for Malays and a public discourse on ethnic 
harmony is one of these ambiguities. Furthermore, the process of Islamisation in Malaysia 
remains somehow fragmented and incomplete because it is always confronted with its (ethnic) 
boundaries. At the same time it is implemented through developmentalist state policies and 
authoritarian modes of governance, which influence the negotiations of development 
concepts. 
. 
In Senegal, however, Islamisation is an ongoing process that is much more shaped by social 
movements and different forms of local Islam, which have their part in the formation of a 
Muslim society. The state is assuming a secular position and maintains a silent agreement 
with the traditional Sufi orders, but finds itself in a conflictive relationship with reformist 
Islamic organisations, which openly challenge the western oriented outlook of national 
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development policies. Civil society actors enter in a strategic partnership with the government 
to counterbalance the influence of popular Islamic movements.  
Whereas in Sudan the Islamisation project is currently undergoing a process of change. 
Islamisation in Sudan was implemented as a project of restructuration guided by a military 
dictatorship and addressing all spheres of life. Therefore little room for negotiation was left 
for social actors to influence the direction of change. The current changes in the nature of the 
project can be understood by referring to the need of the state to open up for a more 
democratic system because of external pressure. Accordingly the space for negotiation is 
considerably enlarged. 
 
The second dimension of comparison focuses on the state development agenda. In Malaysia 
the state is focusing on economic development and controlling all spheres related to 
development in the classical sense. Little space is left for civil society organisations to address 
issues related to economic development. The result is that civil actors, including women’s 
NGOs are concentrating on ‘rights’ oriented discourses.  
 
The picture is comparable in Sudan. The Islamisation project imposed severe limitations for 
civil organisations. The Islamisation of the economic, social, political and even the military 
institutions reflected the development discourse of the state. It hindered the engagement of 
women’s organisations in shaping the development agenda. While the state is still 
monopolising the classic development fields in order to ensure the enforcement of its 
privatisation policy, there is now an enlargement of the space of civil society in which 
women’s NGOs are allowed to focus on the ‘rights’ issues, having already been engaged in 
the poverty alleviation.  
 
The case is considerably different in Senegal, where local Islamic traditions occupy a space 
separate from the secular Western model of the state. The government allowed women’s 
organisations to develop a long history of engagement in classical development issues. 
Women’s commitment in development and civil organisation became instrumental to the 
project of nation building. The formulation of a critical development agenda by women’s 
organisations is, hence, reflecting the need to challenge the established gender order and to 
scrutinise the state’s conformist attitude towards gender issues.  
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To shed light on the notion of ‘rights’ of women NGOs, i.e. the third dimension for 
comparison, in all the three cases the field work revealed that the notion of ‘rights’ represents 
a field of negotiation that is often shaped by reference to different Islam(s). In addition in 
Malaysia the negotiation of ‘rights’ is also shaped by the multi-ethnic dimensions of the 
society. In relation to Islam it is observable that various discourses on Islam are emerging to 
support women’s call for economic, social and political rights and to challenge the state’s or 
other religious authorities’ discourse on Islam. In this sense women redefine the notion of 
‘rights’ according to their situation.  
 
Within the frame of negotiating ‘rights’ various spaces are constituted. One major space of 
negotiating development concepts is shaped by the interface between women’s NGOs and the 
state to define ‘rights’. In both cases, Malaysia and Sudan, the discourse on VAW and women 
human rights represent an entry point for women’s NGOs. In Malaysia this discourse is less 
politicised and the state sees no political danger in women’s engagement in this discourse as 
long as they are not ‘interfering’ in the critical areas of economic development. In Sudan, on 
the other hand, VAW is a highly politicised issue. Nevertheless it represents an entry point to 
women’s NGOs to engage in civil and political work. This is particularly the case because one 
important means for the state to change its Islamist outlook is to open the space for NGOs to 
address human rights issues. In Senegal, however, it is the process of implementing rights 
which shapes the critical relation of women’s NGOs to the state. Within the frame of poverty 
reduction, as a major development concern of both state and NGOs, women’s NGOs enter the 
area of negotiating rights by developing distance from the state position. 
 
Global notions of ‘rights’ are not only negotiated at the state level, but also at translocal 
levels. Notions of ‘rights’ are developed in global spaces such as the UN conference Beijing 
and the follow up process of  Beijing + 10.  However, to advocate or negotiate a specific 
notion of ‘rights’ women NGOs are engaged in various types of networks.  In the context of 
the networking relations of women NGOs different kind of identities are constituted.  There 
are the translocal networks of Muslim women who try to conceptualise ‘rights’ within an 
Islamic frame. There are also the networks developed around specific issues like CEDAW or 
VAW which focus on a global rather than a religious frame for ‘rights’.  In addition to these 
there are the regionally based networks that emphasise African or Asian regional specificity 
while formulating and advocating women’s ‘rights’ 
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As a conclusive remark, by studying the different types of negotiating development concepts 
the project aims at analysing the transformation processes that take place in Muslim Societies. 
The concept of translocal gendered spaces is useful for understanding the global and gendered 
dimensions of the different Islamisation processes. In addition it helps following the relation 
between global and local notions of ‘rights’. Finally working with the concept of translocal 
gendered spaces is significant for analysing the logic of action of social agents. 
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